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Since the publication of Pierre Hadot’s essays on ancient philosophy by
Arnold Davidson in 1995,2 Michel Foucault’s late work on ‘‘the care of the
self’’3 has appeared in a new light. We now know that Hadot’s work was
familiar to Foucault as early as the 1950s.4 It is also clear that Foucault’s
notion of ‘‘techniques of the self’’ is very close to what Hadot calls ‘‘spiri-
tual exercises.’’ At the same time, there are important differences between
the views of these two philosophers, and Hadot has often expressed his
regret that Foucault’s untimely death prevented them from exploring these
differences.5 One important point of disagreement was the status of eclecti-
cism. In Foucault’s interpretation of ancient philosophy, the ‘‘constitution
of the self’’ implied a personal choice among disparate philosophical refer-
ences: ‘‘Writing as a personal exercise done by the self and for the self, is
an art of disparate truth.’’6 In a 1989 article Hadot argued from a historical
point of view that, so far as Stoicism and Epicureanism were concerned,
1 Thanks to Lanier Anderson and Joshua Landy for comments and suggestions.
2 Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, ed. and intro. Arnold Davidson (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1995).
3 Michel Foucault, The Care of the Self, vol. 3 of The History of Sexuality (New York:
Random House, 1986).
4 Pierre Hadot, ‘‘Un dialogue interrompu avec Michel Foucault: Convergences et diver-
gences,’’ in Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique, preface Arnold Davidson (Paris:
Albin Michel, 2002), 305.
5 See Arnold Davidson, ‘‘Ethics as Ascetics,’’ in Foucault and the Writing of History, ed.
Jan Goldstein (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1994), 63–80.
6 Michel Foucault, ‘‘Writing the Self,’’ in Foucault and his Interlocutors, ed. and intro.
Arnold Davidson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 239.
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eclecticism had no place in a mature practice of philosophy. Foucault’s fa-
vorite example, Seneca’s Letters to Lucilius, in which Stoic arguments were
invoked along with Epicurean arguments, was a work for beginners. In a
mature practice of Stoicism, one would stick to the arguments of the Stoic
school, choose them for their coherence, and instead of trying to forge a
spiritual identity for oneself through writing, one would ‘‘liberate oneself
from one’s individuality in order to raise oneself up to universality.’’7 Hadot
added that ‘‘it is only in the New Academy—in the person of Cicero, for
instance—that a personal choice is made according to what reason consid-
ers as most likely at a given moment.’’8 This discussion of Foucault may
give the impression that Hadot was somewhat dismissive of eclecticism. Yet
in a 2001 interview Hadot claimed that he had always admired Cicero’s
intellectual independence, and he proposed a reappraisal ‘‘of an attitude
that has always had a bad reputation: eclecticism.’’9
Something very similar is a stake in the work of Alexander Nehamas,
as Lanier Anderson and Joshua Landy showed in their study of his Art of
Living. In the conception of philosophy as a ‘‘way of life’’ (Hadot) or ‘‘care
of the self’’ (Foucault) or ‘‘self-fashioning’’ (Nehamas), a central issue is the
relationship between theoretical coherence and the coherence of the person
who theorizes. Elaborating on Nehamas’s chapter on Montaigne, Anderson
and Landy argue that there is a move in Montaigne away from doctrinal
coherence and towards a coherence of the self. As they put it, ‘‘the harmoni-
ous whole Montaigne commends [ . . . ] is not a coherent body of fact or
theory; it is the unified self of the theorizer.’’10 Anderson and Landy show
that this brings up all kinds of difficulties: can this unified self be other than
a fiction? If that is the case, how can philosophy be a way of life? Neha-
mas’s answer is very much in the spirit of the late Foucault: there is a coher-
ence of the self in Montaigne, and this coherence is the product of writing
as a philosophical activity. The self is fashioned through writing.
Because Montaigne writes in the ancient tradition of philosophy as a
way of life, one may recall Hadot’s suggestion that Foucault’s notion of
7 Pierre Hadot, ‘‘Reflections on the Idea of the ‘Cultivation of the Self,’ ’’ in Philosophy
as a Way of Life, 210; ‘‘Re´flexions sur la notion de ‘culture de soi’ ’’ in Michel Foucault
philosophe (Paris: Seuil, 1989), 261–70.
8 Ibid.
9 ‘‘Qu’est-ce que l’e´thique? Entretien avec Pierre Hadot,’’ Exercices spirituels et philoso-
phie antique, 387.
10 R. Lanier Anderson and Joshua Landy, ‘‘Philosophy as Self-Fashioning: Alexander
Nehamas’s Art of Living,’’ Diacritics 31 (2001): 32. See Alexander Nehamas, The Art of
Living. Socratic Reflections from Plato to Foucault (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1998).
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‘‘writing the self’’ is an intriguing but historically inaccurate description of
ancient philosophical practice. But perhaps Hadot agrees with Foucault
after all, since in his most recent interviews, he speaks favorably of eclecti-
cism, a notion that is central to Foucault’s analysis of self-fashioning
through writing. The case of Montaigne is particularly interesting for these
purposes, not only because the Essays seem to be the prototypical example
of ‘‘writing the self,’’ but also because eclecticism is both discussed and
practiced throughout the Essays. I propose to take a fresh look at this issue
by investigating the status of eclecticism in Montaigne’s Essays. This must
start with an examination of the philosophical tradition most closely asso-
ciated with the practice of eclecticism, the Skeptical tradition.
A SKEPTICAL CRISIS?
In Richard Popkin’s classic history of Skepticism, Montaigne is treated as
a foundational figure.11 According to Popkin, the Pyrrhonian Skepticism
developed by Montaigne in the ‘‘Apology for Raymond Sebond’’ is both
the logical continuation and the radicalization of various forms of doubt
that were present in Renaissance humanism. In that sense, Montaigne is
both the continuator of Renaissance humanism and its terminator, who
makes the way for modern thought. There is something appealing in this
dramatic presentation, but the claims are so sweeping that they naturally
invite the kind of Skeptical scrutiny Popkin so eloquently describes. Rather
than testing the claim that Montaigne’s Skepticism was ‘‘the womb of mod-
ern thought,’’12 I would like to show how Popkin arrived at this character-
ization of Montaigne and what this says about twentieth and twenty-first-
century interpretations of Montaigne as a philosopher.
Popkin’s notion of a Skeptical crisis, or crise pyrrhonienne,13 is bor-
rowed from Pierre Villey, who published a monumental study of the sources
of Montaigne’s Essays in 1908.14 Popkin acknowledges his debt and in fact
he explicitly relies on Villey for his account of the ‘‘Apology for Raymond
Sebond’’ and of Montaigne’s thought in general. According to Villey, who
meticulously established which books Montaigne read and when he read
11 Richard H. Popkin, The History of Skepticism from Savonarola to Bayle (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2003).
12 The History of Skepticism from Savonarola to Bayle, 56.
13 Ibid.
14 Pierre Villey, Les Sources et l’e´volution des Essais de Montaigne, 2 vols. (Paris: Ha-
chette, 1908).
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them, Montaigne wrote the ‘‘Apology for Raymond Sebond’’ after reading
the Outlines of Pyrrhonism by Sextus Empiricus, a work that became
widely known only after it was translated into Latin by Henri Estienne in
1562. Villey’s ‘‘evolutionary thesis’’ is a three-stage narrative. The early
Montaigne was, or tried to be a Stoic. He went through a Skeptical crisis
after reading Sextus Empiricus, and he overcame that crisis by becoming an
Epicurean of sorts, or ‘‘naturalist.’’ Villey also claims that Montaigne’s
early essays are ‘‘impersonal’’ and lacking in originality, while the later
essays and additions to the early essays are more ‘‘personal’’ and original.
When Popkin refers to Montaigne’s ‘‘Apologie de Raimond Sebond’’
as ‘‘that amazing product of his own personal crise pyrrhonienne’’15 he is
in a sense simply following Villey’s interpretation of Montaigne. On the
other hand, he implicitly makes two moves that are questionable. First, he
focuses almost exclusively on the ‘‘Apology for Raymond Sebond.’’ It may
well be the case, as he claims, that ‘‘many sides of Montaigne meet’’16 in
this essay but focusing on one (admitted long) essay in a much larger book
necessarily gives us a narrow view. Second, Montaigne’s crise pyrrhonienne
is presented as an individual instance of a crisis that affected the intellectual
world of the Renaissance as a whole. One could argue that the underlying
logic (or at least the genealogy) of Popkin’s argument is exactly the oppo-
site: what we see in Popkin is a spectacular expansion of Villey’s expression,
crise pyrrhonienne, which was supposed to describe one episode in Mon-
taigne’s intellectual formation, to the entire intellectual landscape of early
modern Europe.
Given the extent to which Popkin’s account of Renaissance Skepticism
relies on Villey’s account of Montaigne’s Skepticism, it is worth mentioning
here that Villey’s ‘‘evolutionary thesis’’ has been abundantly questioned by
Montaigne scholars. In particular, Montaigne’s allegiance to Pyrrhonian
Skepticism is no longer taken for granted. In a recent article discussing the
‘‘Skeptical crisis’’ in Montaigne, Defaux claims that there was never any
such thing.17 Other scholars have stressed the importance of Academic (as
15 Popkin, The History of Skepticism from Savonarola to Bayle, 47.
16 Ibid.
17 Ge´rard Defaux, ‘‘Montaigne, la vie, les livres: naissance d’un philosophe sceptique et
‘impremedite´,’ ’’ Modern Language Notes 117 (2002): 780–807. Also see Philippe Desan,
‘‘Bre`ve histoire de Montaigne dans ses couches,’’ Montaigne Studies 7 (1995): 35–52.
Recent studies of Montaigne’s Skepticism include: Emmanuel Naya, Essais de Michel
Seigneur de Montaigne (Paris: Ellipses, 2006); Zahi Zalloua, Montaigne and the Ethics
of Skepticism (Charlottesville: Rockwood Press, 2005); Marie-Luce Demonet, A plaisir.
Se´miotique et scepticisme chez Montaigne (Orle´ans: Paradigme, 2002); Silvia Giocanti,
Penser l’irre´solution. Montaigne, Pascal, La Mothe Le Vayer: trois itine´raires sceptiques
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opposed to Pyrrhonian) Skepticism in Montaigne. While the Pyrrhonians
practiced the suspension of judgment (epoche) in order to achieve a state of
indifference that brought inner tranquility, the Academics combined the
suspension of judgment with an inquisitive (‘‘zetetic’’) posture. The duty of
the Academic Skeptic (as described for instance in Cicero’s Academica) was
to keep searching for truth even while knowing that truth was probably out
of reach. In addition, the Academic Skeptic would exercise libertas philoso-
phandi by picking and choosing among various philosophical schools and
embracing some opinions on a provisional basis if they seemed more plausi-
ble. Some scholars have argued that this may in fact be a better description
of Montaigne’s intellectual profile and indeed of the role of Skepticism in
the emergence of the new science and of eighteenth-century empiricism.
According to Jose´ Maia Neto, features of Academic Skepticism, especially
from Cicero’s Academica, ‘‘are basic to the Skepticism revived in the late
Renaissance by Montaigne and Charron; were related to the new science in
the first half of the seventeenth century by Gassendi; were used in the anti-
Cartesian reaction of the late seventeenth century by Rapin, Huet, Bayle
and above all Fouchet; and were radicalized in the eighteenth century by
Hume.’’18 Neto also notices that even as he is explaining the main points of
Pyrrhonian Skepticism in the ‘‘Apology for Raymond Sebond’’ Montaigne
draws constantly from Cicero’s Academica. In particular, Montaigne’s
praise of the Skeptics’ intellectual integrity is drawn from Cicero: ‘‘Why
shall it not be granted similarly to these men to maintain their liberty, and
to consider things without obligation and servitude?’’19 As Neto puts it,
‘‘Montaigne sees in the Academic’s notion of sustinere the architectonic
constitution of the intellect in its integrity.’’20
(Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 2001); Jan Miernowski, L’Ontologie de la con-
tradiction sceptique. Pour l’e´tude de la me´taphysique des Essais (Paris: Champion, 1998);
Ian MacLean, Montaigne philosophe (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1996).
18 Jose´ Maia Neto, ‘‘Academic Skepticism in Early Modern Philosophy,’’ JHI 58 (1997):
199. Also see Jean-Charles Darmon, ‘‘Remarques sur la rhe´torique ‘probabiliste’ de Gas-
sendi: ses enjeux et ses effets dans l’histoire de la Re´publique des lettres,’’ Dix-septie`me
sie`cle 233 (2006): 665–700.
19 ‘‘Apology for Raymond Sebond,’’ The Complete Essays of Montaigne, trans. Donald
M. Frame (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), 2:12, 373. All citations from this
edition will be referred by book number, followed by chapter and then page numbers in
the manner shown here.
20 Jose´ Maia Neto, ‘‘Epoche as Perfection: Montaigne’s View of Ancient Skepticism,’’ in
Skepticism in Renaissance and Post-Renaissance Thought: New Interpretations, edited
by Jose´ Maia Neto and Richard Henry Popkin (Amherst: Humanity Books, 2004), 18.
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MONTAIGNE’S PHILOSOPHICAL INCOHERENCE
Before entering the debate on the characterization of Montaigne’s Skepti-
cism or his allegiance to any philosophical doctrine, I would like to point
out that this debate exists because readers of Montaigne usually find him
philosophically incoherent. This was one of the major issues Villey had to
confront when he tried to give a comprehensive account of the sources and
evolution of Montaigne’s Essays. For instance, in his chapter on Mon-
taigne’s method, Villey compares the 1580 and 1588 editions of the Essays.
He notices that, on the one hand, Montaigne has not changed the views he
expresses in the ‘‘Apology for Raymond Sebond.’’ The 1588 additions to
the ‘‘Apology’’ have one thing in common: they reinforce the Pyrrhonian
stance taken in that essay. This leads Villey to conclude that ‘‘Montaigne
would still endorse the Apologie de Sebond.’’21 On the other hand, Villey
insists, ‘‘another indubitable fact is that Montaigne is not a Pyrrhonian at
all.’’22 Montaigne makes all kinds of assertions, carefully but firmly. ‘‘How
does one resolve this contradiction?’’23 Villey asks. Of course, no literary
critic will ever shy away from such a challenge. Villey embraces it enthusi-
astically and asserts that ‘‘there is no contradiction.’’24 He argues that be-
tween 1580 and 1588, Montaigne read Cicero’s Academica. The more
moderate form of Skepticism expressed in that work led him to revise the
radical Skepticism he had embraced in the ‘‘Apology for Raymond Seb-
ond.’’ In 1588, Montaigne is still deeply critical of human reason, but he
derives different conclusions from this critique. He is no longer looking
for metaphysical knowledge. He has become a relativist and he focuses on
facts.25
It is remarkable that approximately one century after Villey, recent
studies of Montaigne’s Skepticism present the issue in very similar terms. In
her article on Montaigne and Skepticism in the Cambridge Companion to
Montaigne, Ann Hartle begins by contrasting the Skeptical stance found in
the ‘‘Apology for Raymond Sebond’’ with some ‘‘decidedly non-skeptical
figures of his thought’’26 (the fact that he does make judgments, his profes-
sion of Catholic faith, his apparent credulity regarding fabulous stories).




25 Villey, Les Sources et l’e´volution des Essais de Montaigne, 2:312.
26 Ann Hartle, ‘‘Montaigne and Skepticism,’’ The Cambridge Companion to Montaigne
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 189.
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Here is how Hartle summarizes the problem: ‘‘Either Montaigne is an in-
consistent thinker, incorporating contradictory and incompatible philo-
sophical views within an ultimately incoherent and ill-defined literary
work, or he is an original philosopher, transcending the boundaries of the
classical-Christian tradition.’’27 For Hartle, Montaigne is of course the lat-
ter, and she tries to show the consistency of his thought, as well as his
originality as a philosopher. She describes Montaigne’s thought as a dialec-
tical process with a Skeptical moment.
My purpose here is not to discuss these interpretations in any detail. It
is simply to show that Villey’s approach and Hartle’s approach have the
same underlying logic. They both want to take Montaigne seriously as a
philosopher, and they assume he professes a coherent doctrine. After read-
ing the Essays carefully, they find all sorts of contradictions. Villey’s solu-
tion is to postulate an evolution in Montaigne’s thinking: the contradictory
theses correspond to different moments in Montaigne’s intellectual evolu-
tion. Hartle’s solution is to assume that a Hegelian-style dialectic is at work
in Montaigne’s thought. The Skeptical theses of the ‘‘Apology for Raymond
Sebond’’ are the negative moment in a dialectical process that culminates
in the re-affirmation of the Christian faith. In both Villey and Hartle, the
desire to show Montaigne’s coherence is very much tied to a desire to ascer-
tain his ‘‘originality’’ as an author. Inconsistent thinkers cannot be original
because they simply repeat what they have read here and there. Only consis-
tent thinkers are original because they have absorbed external influences
and developed a vision that is uniquely theirs.
I would like to question these assumptions. Is it fair to say that the
choice is between reading the Essays as ‘‘incoherent and ill-defined’’ litera-
ture, and reading the Essays as coherent philosophy? And what does it
mean to be an ‘‘original philosopher?’’ Let us begin with a well-known fact.
Not only in the ‘‘Apology for Raymond Sebond’’ but also in many places
in the Essays, Montaigne criticizes all forms of organized knowledge: legal,
medical, and philosophical. This critique often takes the form of an opposi-
tion between life and knowledge, and Montaigne argues that only life and
the pursuit of virtue are really important. In some contexts, the opposition
is between words and deeds, as in the classic topos of Athens vs. Sparta.
The Athenians speak well but the Spartans live righteously: ‘‘There it was
a continual exercise of the tongue, here a continual exercise of the soul.’’28
Elsewhere in the same essay Montaigne praises the legendary lawgiver Ly-
27 Hartle, ‘‘Montaigne and Skepticism,’’ 191.
28 ‘‘Of pedantry,’’ The Complete Essays of Montaigne, 1:25, 105.
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curgus for giving a very small place to doctrinal knowledge in his design of
an educational system for Sparta. The focus was on moral education.29 In
the ‘‘Apology for Raymond Sebond,’’ Montaigne famously contrasts the
wisdom of university deans with that of artisans and plowmen, and insists
that doctrinal knowledge is necessary to life only to the extent that it can
provide money and fame. Otherwise, and particularly when it comes to
handling the real business of life and knowing how to face death, it is use-
less.30 Also in the ‘‘Apology,’’ Montaigne alludes to an ancient philosophi-
cal tradition according to which philosophical writing is a less-than-serious
endeavor:
Chrysippus said that what Plato and Aristotle had written about
logic they had written as a game and for exercise, and could not
believe that they had spoken seriously of such an empty matter.
Plutarch says the same of metaphysics. Epicurus would have said
it also of rhetoric, grammar, poetry, mathematics, and all the sci-
ences except physics. And Socrates also of all except only that
which treats of morals and life.31
What is remarkable in this passage is that it draws from all the main philo-
sophical schools in order to highlight a feature they all share. Chrysippus,
the founder of Stoicism, Epicurus, the founder of Epicureanism, Plutarch,
an Academic Skeptic, Plato and Aristotle all agree that writing can be useful
but philosophy is, first and foremost, an oral practice. As a result, it is a
mistake to take philosophical writings too seriously. What is really impor-
tant in the practice of philosophy takes place in a conversation between
master and disciple, or in a conversation the philosopher has with himself
(N.B.: the gendered language is a reflection of Montaigne’s conception of
philosophy as conversation between men—even though his favorite reader
and interlocutor happened to be a woman, Marie de Gournay). Points of
doctrine presented in written form can be useful, of course, but doctrinal
coherence is not an end in itself. The purpose of philosophy, to quote Mon-
taigne again, is ‘‘a continual exercise of the soul.’’32 Philosophers exercise
their souls as athletes exercise their bodies in order to achieve spiritual
health, knowing of course that perfect wisdom is out of reach and philoso-
29 ‘‘Of pedantry,’’ 1:25, 104.
30 ‘‘Apology for Raymond Sebond,’’ 2:12, 359.
31 ‘‘Apology for Raymond Sebond,’’ 2:12, 376.
32 ‘‘Of pedantry,’’ 1:25, 105.
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phers, as lovers of wisdom, can only strive for what they love. In that sense
it is both naı¨ve and misguided to try to pin down philosophers and ask
them what they ‘‘really’’ believe or what they personally subscribe to (aside
from their basic commitment to the pursuit of wisdom). Montaigne quotes
Cicero on this point: ‘‘They who inquire what we personally think about
each matter are more curious than is necessary.’’33
From the passages I have quoted, one may get the impression that in
this ancient conception of philosophy, to which Montaigne subscribes, phil-
osophical discourse is devalued. This is not the case at all. Philosophical
discourse does play a fundamental role, but its importance is tied to the fact
that it has practical consequences: converting the student to philosophical
life, or helping the philosopher continue leading a philosophical life. In this
conception of philosophy as spiritual exercise, philosophical notions are
meaningful to the extent that they are lived and internalized. For Mon-
taigne, Socrates and Aristippus are perfect and inimitable examples of this
because their ‘‘habituation to virtue’’ is such that ‘‘it has passed into their
nature,’’ and has become ‘‘the very essence of their soul, its natural and
ordinary gait.’’34
The practice of philosophy as spiritual exercise does not bar the use of
concepts. It does not forbid attempts to generalize or draw conclusions. Far
from it: discussing ideas is what philosophers do. However, the discussion
is only a means to an end, which is the shaping of a soul that has ‘‘strength
and beauty.’’35 In that sense, organized knowledge does not have much
value in and of itself, but it can be very useful as a pretext for discussion.
According to Montaigne, philosophers ‘‘did not think it inappropriate to
exercise and amuse their minds on things in which there was no solid
profit.’’36 Similarly, if the purpose is to store up knowledge, reading is ulti-
mately a futile activity, but reading can be a very good way of training one’s
mind: ‘‘Books have served me not so much for instruction as for exercise.’’37
ECLECTICISM AS A PHILOSOPHICAL PROJECT
This presentation so far may lead one to think that philosophical schools
do not matter. They do. All ancient philosophers pledge allegiance to a
33 ‘‘Apology for Raymond Sebond,’’ 2:12, 376 (Cicero, De natura deorum, I, v).
34 ‘‘Of cruelty,’’ 2:11, 310.
35 ‘‘Of the art of discussion,’’ 3:8, 718.
36 ‘‘Of cruelty,’’ 2:12, 377.
37 ‘‘Of physiognomy,’’ 3:12, 795.
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particular school, which provides a vocabulary, a set of concepts and teach-
ing methods, and a tradition of thought. This applies to the Skeptics, in-
cluding the Pyrrhonian Skeptics. What is different about the Skeptics is
that they do philosophy by discussing the thoughts of other, non-Skeptical
philosophers. Academic Skeptics, in particular, practice what one could call
a serious and reasoned form of eclecticism.38 In our modern conception
of philosophy, eclecticism has a bad name, and is usually associated with
intellectual laziness or mental confusion. Yet when Montaigne endeavors
to name his two favorite authors, he mentions Seneca and Plutarch, who
are striking examples of an eclectic way of thinking.39 Seneca is a Stoic
philosopher, but in his Letters to Lucilius, he is not afraid of quoting Epicu-
rus and using Epicurean arguments. Montaigne describes Seneca’s opinions
as ‘‘Stoic and Epicurean.’’40 As to Plutarch, Daniel Babut has demonstrated
that he writes in the tradition of Academic Skepticism.41 Babut’s study of
Plutarch is particularly illuminating for our purposes because the standard
scholarship on Plutarch resembles the standard scholarship on Montaigne.
Faced with the main features of Plutarch’s thought (his profession of Skep-
ticism, his admiration for Plato, and his profession of religious belief),
scholars concluded that Plutarch changed his mind over time, or that he
didn’t mean what he said, or that he was a weak and confused thinker.
Yet, as Babut shows, these difficulties disappear if one agrees to consider
Plutarch’s eclecticism as a serious philosophical endeavor.
Is Montaigne a Skeptic? If so, is he an Academic or a Pyrrhonian Skep-
tic? As we have just seen, the issue of allegiance is a particularly ambiguous
one for the Skeptics, since the Academic Skeptics define themselves by their
refusal to pledge allegiance to any school, and the Pyrrhonians claim they
are neither Pyrrhonian nor anti-Pyrrhonian. In the ‘‘Apology for Raymond
Sebond,’’ Montaigne endorses the distinction made by Sextus Empiricus
between three classes of philosophers: the dogmatists, the Academic Skep-
tics (who are dogmatic in a way because they affirm that nothing can be
known), and the Pyrrhonians who are the real Skeptics because they refuse
38 See The Question of ‘‘Eclecticism’’, edited by John M. Dillon and A. A. Long, (Berke-
ley: University of California Press, 1988), and Ilsetraut Hadot, ‘‘Du bon et du mauvais
usage du terme ‘e´clectisme’ dans l’histoire de la philosophie antique,’’ Herme´neutique et
ontologie. Me´langes en hommage a` Pierre Aubenque (Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France, 1990), 147–62.
39 ‘‘Of books,’’ 2:10, 300.
40 Ibid.
41 Daniel Babut, ‘‘Du scepticisme au de´passement de la raison: philosophie et foi religieuse
chez Plutarque,’’ in Parerga. Choix d’articles de Daniel Babut (1974–1994) (Lyon: Mai-
son de l’Orient me´diterrane´en, 1994), 549–81.
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to say whether knowledge is possible.42 Yet, as we have seen before, this
favorable presentation of the Pyrrhonian classification relies on numerous
references to the main proponent of Academic Skepticism, Cicero. In addi-
tion, Montaigne’s practice of eclecticism seems very close to what we see in
Cicero’s Academica or Plutarch’s Moralia. Rather than choosing between
the Academics and the Pyrrhonians, Montaigne appears to be more inter-
ested in suggesting, somewhat facetiously, that deep down all philosophers
are Skeptics, including ‘‘the prince of dogmatists,’’ Aristotle: ‘‘We see him
often deliberately covering himself with such thick and inextricable obscu-
rity that we cannot pick out anything from his opinion. It is in fact a Pyrr-
honism in an affirmative form.’’43
The practice of eclecticism is closely related to another point that Mon-
taigne makes over and over: philosophizing is a way of exercising one’s
judgment (judicium or judicandi potestas, to use Cicero’s vocabulary).
Having good judgment is in fact the only thing Montaigne claims to be
proud of, but as he puts it facetiously again, this will not win praise from
anybody: ‘‘The only thing that makes me think something of myself is the
thing in which no man ever thought himself deficient: my recommendation
is vulgar, common and popular, for who ever thought he lacked sense?’’44
THE PHILOSOPHICAL IMPORTANCE OF STYLE
As we have just seen, Montaigne’s ‘‘incoherence’’ is a consequence of his
following the philosophical method of Cicero and Plutarch, but there are
aspects of his ‘‘incoherence’’ that go beyond the method of any particular
school and simply come from Montaigne’s focus on philosophy as practice
and exercise, as opposed to system-building. As Pierre Hadot has shown,
using Wittgenstein’s vocabulary, ancient philosophy must be understood as
a series of language games with specific rules.45 In particular, one must pay
attention to the ‘‘literary’’ aspects of philosophical discourse: the genre, the
style, the addressee, the context, and so on. In the case of Montaigne’s
Essays, it seems clear that each essay has its own logic, which is a logic of
question and answer: the coherence of each essay comes from the question
42 ‘‘Apology for Raymond Sebond,’’ 2:12, 371. Cf. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrr-
honism, 1.1.1–4.
43 ‘‘Apology for Raymond Sebond,’’ 2:12, 376.
44 ‘‘Of presumption,’’ 2:17, 498.
45 Pierre Hadot, Wittgenstein et les limites du langage (Paris: Vrin, 2004), 11.
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or questions it discusses. However it would be futile to look for an over-
arching coherence in the whole work. As Hadot puts it regarding ancient
philosophy in general, ‘‘each logos is a ‘system,’ but the totality of logoi
written by a given author does not constitute a system.’’46 Some of Mon-
taigne’s essays are written for a particular addressee. The essay ‘‘Of vanity’’
belongs to a specific philosophical genre: the examination of conscience.
The essay ‘‘That to philosophize is to learn to die’’ is a meditatio mortis.
The choice of the essay as a genre is in itself philosophically significant, and
looking at it in the perspective of philosophy as a way of life may help
resolve some of the difficulties scholars had in describing the relationship
between Montaigne’s Essays and earlier forms of gnomic literature such
as Plutarch’s Moralia or Erasmus’s Adages. Villey noticed the similarities
between the Essays and earlier humanist collections of sententiae, but he
emphasized the fact that these collections of moral topoi seemed extremely
dull and impersonal to the modern reader.47 He went on to describe Mon-
taigne’s literary enterprise as a gradual assertion of originality with respect
to these humanist and ancient models. There is no doubt that the Essays
have a voice that is more personal than anything present in Plutarch or
Erasmus. However, Villey’s approach overlooks crucial aspects of the an-
cient and humanist practices of ‘‘writing the self.’’ In his analysis of the
genre of hypomnemata (the art of collecting moral sentences for one’s own
use) Foucault emphasizes the very personal nature of this practice. At the
same time, he insists that there is a fundamental difference between this
way of writing the self and the ‘‘narratives of the self’’ that can be found in
later Christian literature. As Foucault puts it, ‘‘it is not a matter of pursuing
the unsayable, nor of revealing the hidden, nor of saying the unsaid, but on
the contrary of capturing the already-said, or reassembling what one could
hear or read, and this for an end than is nothing less than the constitution
of the self.’’48 What seems paradoxical or even impossible to Villey’s post-
Romantic understanding of literary originality is clear to Foucault: the
practice of hypomnemata is both impersonal and very personal. The topoi
one collects belong to everyone, but they are meant to be appropriated in a
uniquely personal fashion. This must be kept in mind in any attempt to
analyze Montaigne’s voice in the Essays.
Each essay is a conversation of Montaigne with himself. There are sev-
eral layers of text. Therefore, asking what Montaigne’s position is on this
46 Pierre Hadot, ‘‘Spiritual Exercises,’’ Philosophy as a Way of Life, 105.
47 Villey, Les Sources et l’e´volution des Essais de Montaigne, 2:7–37.
48 Michel Foucault, ‘‘Writing the Self,’’ Philosophy as a Way of Life, 237.
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or that issue is asking the wrong question. As Montaigne puts it in ‘‘Of the
art of discussion,’’ what you say is less important than how you say it: ‘‘We
are concerned with the manner, not the matter, of speaking. My humor is
to consider the form as much as the substance, the advocate as much as the
cause, as Alcibiades ordered we should do.’’49 This has sometimes been
interpreted as a formalist position,50 but it is exactly the opposite. What
Montaigne means is that ‘‘being right’’ or ‘‘saying something true’’ is use-
less if those who say the truth do not understand the truth of what they are
saying. We must find out how they say it in order to find out ‘‘how [the
truth] is lodged in its author.’’51 In the art of conversation, the ultimate test
is not a test of truth but a test of wisdom: one wants to find out whether
the interlocutor is foolish or wise. This is how one should understand Mon-
taigne’s way of reading: ‘‘I amuse myself reading authors without any care
for their learning, looking for their style, not their subject.’’52 It does not
mean an indifference to ideas. The ‘‘literary’’ test that Montaigne applies to
authors is ultimately a philosophical test. Looking at the ‘‘style’’ or the
‘‘manner’’ is the only way of deciding whether a particular statement is
rooted in genuine wisdom.
We can see here that in Montaigne (as in any author in the tradition of
philosophy as a way of life) philosophical discourse cannot and should not
be separated from its literary form. This appears very clearly in Mon-
taigne’s interpretation of other philosophers. In the passage I quoted earlier
on Aristotle’s obscurity, Montaigne draws philosophical consequences
from a stylistic remark: Aristotle is obscure because he does not want to be
seen as endorsing any position too clearly. Similarly, Montaigne under-
stands Plutarch’s choice of a digressive and allusive style as a choice of
philosophical method:
There are in Plutarch many extensive discussions, well worth
knowing, for in my judgment he is the master workman in that
field; but there are a thousand that he has only just touched on; he
merely points out with his finger where we are to go, if we like,
and sometimes is content to make only a stab at the heart of the
subject. We must snatch these bits out of there and display them
49 ‘‘Of the art of discussion,’’ 3:8, 708.
50 See Jean-Yves Pouilloux, Montaigne. L’e´veil de la pense´e (Paris: Champion, 1995).
51 ‘‘Of the art of discussion,’’ 3:8, 715. See Pierre Force, ‘‘Innovation as Spiritual Exercise:
Montaigne and Pascal,’’ JHI 66 (2005): 17–35.
52 ‘‘Of the art of discussion,’’ 3:8, 708.
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properly. Just as that remark of his that the inhabitants of Asia
served one single man because they could not pronounce one sin-
gle syllable, which is ‘‘No,’’ may have given the matter and the
impulsion to La Boe´tie for his Voluntary Servitude.53
Montaigne expresses some ambivalence with respect to Plutarch’s allusive
style. He begins by expressing his frustration as a reader: ‘‘It is a pity that
men of understanding are fond of brevity; doubtless their reputation gains
by it, but we lose by it.’’54 He immediately adds, however, that Plutarch’s
practice is deliberate: ‘‘Plutarch would rather we praised him for his judg-
ment than for his knowledge; he would rather leave us wanting more of
him than satiated.’’55 Plutarch’s allusive style is a sign of his good judgment.
Even more importantly, it is a test of the reader’s judgment. The reader is
challenged to complete the thoughts Plutarch has only outlined or men-
tioned in passing. La Boe´tie has met that challenge and shown his good
judgment by writing an entire discourse based on a single line by Plutarch.
Of course, what Montaigne says of Plutarch’s writing applies to his
own. Montaigne’s style is deliberately digressive and allusive: ‘‘I go out of
my way, but rather by license than carelessness.’’56 The title of a given essay
is often a pretext to talk about something else: ‘‘The titles of my chapters
do not always embrace their matter; often they only denote it by some
sign.’’57 This is consistent with the best philosophical tradition: ‘‘I have run
my eyes over a certain dialogue of Plato, a fantastic motley of two parts,
the beginning part about love, all the rest about rhetoric.’’58 The Phaedrus,
like most of Plato’s dialogues, is digressive, and Montaigne suggests that a
digressive style is the best suited to the practice of philosophy:
I love the poetic gait, by leaps and gambols. It is an art, as Plato
says, light, flighty, daemonic. There are works of Plutarch in which
he forgets his theme, in which the treatment of the subject is found
only incidentally, quite smothered in foreign matter. See his move-
ments in ‘‘The Daemon of Socrates.’’ Lord, what beauty there is in
these lusty sallies and this variation, and more so the more casual
and accidental they seem.59
53 ‘‘Of the education of children,’’ 1:26, 115.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
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This style of philosophical writing is both an invitation and a chal-
lenge. It is seductive because it does not bore the reader by dwelling on a
single subject. Speaking of his reader’s attention, Montaigne says: ‘‘it is all
to the good if I chance to arrest it by my embroilment.’’60 At the same time
this style is puzzling and potentially confusing, but this is a test of the read-
er’s ability to continue and appropriate the thoughts: ‘‘It is the inattentive
reader who loses my subject, not I. Some word about it will always be
found in a corner, which will not fail to be sufficient, though it takes little
room.’’61 This is why Montaigne demands his reader’s full and undivided
attention for each essay:
Because such frequent breaks into chapters as I used at the begin-
ning seemed to me to disrupt attention before it was aroused, mak-
ing it disdain to settle and collect for so little, I have begun to make
them longer, requiring fixed purpose and assigned leisure. In such
an occupation, if you will not give a man a single hour, you will
not give him anything. And you do nothing for a man for whom
you do nothing except while doing something else. Besides, per-
haps I have some personal obligation to speak only by halves, to
speak confusedly, to speak discordantly.62
Notwithstanding the ‘‘besides,’’ the two things mentioned in this pas-
sage are closely connected: Montaigne’s ‘‘incoherence’’ demands a very
careful and committed reader. Reading as spiritual exercise requires what
the Stoics call prosoche, i.e. a soul that is fully awake and vigilant.
A CONVERSATION BETWEEN FRIENDS
Ultimately, what the style brings into focus is the author himself, the author
as a person. In the ‘‘art of conversation,’’ which is also an art of reading,
paying attention to the ‘‘manner’’ is a way of getting to know who the
interlocutor or the author is as a person:
He who speaks true can speak as foolishly as he who speaks false;
for we are concerned with the manner, not the matter, of speaking.
My humor is to consider the form as much as the substance, the
advocate as much as the cause, as Alcibiades ordered we should do.
60 ‘‘Of vanity,’’ 3:9, 762.
61 ‘‘Of vanity,’’ 3:9, 761.
62 ‘‘Of vanity,’’ 3:9, 762.
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And every day I amuse myself reading authors without any
care for their learning, looking for their style, not their subject.
Just as I seek the company of some famous mind, not to have him
teach me, but to come to know him.63
This should not be confused with biographical criticism as it is tradi-
tionally understood. Indeed, a very common error in standard Montaigne
scholarship is to discuss the author of the Essays in terms of individual psy-
chology. This can be seen in both Villey and Popkin, who discuss Mon-
taigne’s crise pyrrhonienne as a traumatic experience. According to this
view, reading Sextus Empiricus would have thrown Montaigne into a state
of deep anxiety and caused ‘‘extreme trauma,’’ to use Popkin’s expression.
This makes little sense if one recalls that the Pyrrhonian practice of suspend-
ing judgment was precisely meant to achieve ataraxia, or complete tranquil-
ity of the soul. Discussing Montaigne’s Skepticism as ‘‘his own personal
crise pyrrhonienne’’ psychologizes what is a set of spiritual exercises bor-
rowed from the Pyrrhonian school. When Montaigne writes that no human
custom is universal, not even the prohibition of incest, one is indeed tempted
to see him as depressed or having lost hope in humanity.64 Yet in this passage
Montaigne is not expressing a personal opinion about the prohibition of
incest. He is simply rehearsing a Pyrrhonian argument (one of Sextus Empir-
icus’s ten ‘‘tropes’’) that is meant to help suspend judgment.65
In biographical criticism, one looks at the author’s life in order to make
sense of the text. Montaigne’s interest in an author’s life goes in the oppo-
site direction: from the text to the person. For Montaigne, getting to know
the author means being in a position to assess the author’s intellectual qual-
ities, particularly the author’s judgment. The ideal context for making that
determination is a private conversation between friends. This explains
Montaigne’s intense curiosity for the biography of authors and their private
sayings. It makes him claim that Cicero is more interesting in his Letters to
Atticus than in his public speeches because the letters give us a much better
sense of the nature of his soul. What Brutus said in conversations with his
friends (known to us through his biography by Plutarch) is more interesting
than his lost treatise on virtue would ever be because it is a much better
example of his virtue.66 For Montaigne, it is in little details and in unstudied
63 ‘‘Of the art of discussion,’’ 3:8, 708.
64 ‘‘Apology for Raymond Sebond,’’ 2:12, 437.
65 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 1:152.
66 ‘‘Of books,’’ 2:10, 302.
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behavior that the true nature of someone’s soul appears: ‘‘I know my men
even by their silence and their smiles, and perhaps find out more about
them at table than in the council chamber. Hippomachus used to say
shrewdly that he knew good wrestlers by seeing them just walk in the
street.’’67 The focus on the person is apparent in Montaigne’s way of read-
ing, even when the biographical information is scare. In ‘‘Of the art of
discussion,’’ the assessment of Tacitus’s history is ultimately an assessment
of Tacitus’s character, and especially his judgment. While generally praising
Tacitus, Montaigne criticizes him for saying that he did not mean to brag
when he reported that he had held ‘‘a certain honorable office at Rome.’’68
Reluctance to talk about oneself shows that one is ‘‘a little mean-spirited.’’69
On the contrary, ‘‘a stout and lofty judgment’’ shows as much frankness
‘‘about itself as about a third party.’’70 Consistent with this assertion, Mon-
taigne presents his own judgment as one that passes over ‘‘common rules
of civility in favor of truth and liberty.’’71
CONCLUSION: PHILOSOPHY AND INTIMACY
Let us go back to the beginning of our discussion. Anderson and Landy, in
their account of Nehamas’s Art of Living, argue that there is a move in
Montaigne away from theoretical coherence and toward a coherence of
the theorizer. They assert that Montaigne’s project is ‘‘to present his own
character as an integrated personality.’’72 The coherence of Montaigne’s
character is aesthetic in nature because the sort of unification proper to self-
fashioning ‘‘has features normally associated with artworks.’’73 In order to
clarify their point, Anderson and Landy borrow the concept of ‘‘postulated
author’’ from Nehamas. Distinct from the traditional notion of authorial
intent, the ‘‘postulated author’’ is a regulative ideal designed to give a co-
herent account of all the features of a given text. Montaigne’s life of writ-
ing, which is an experiment in the art of living, ‘‘requires us as readers to
postulate an author with an interesting, admirable, and deeply coherent
67 ‘‘Of three kinds of association,’’ 3:3, 625.
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character.’’74 In other words (and this is valid for all philosophers who prac-
tice the art of living), ‘‘as the philosopher’s readers, we feel satisfied that we
have attributed the correct meaning to her (possibly ironic) expressions
only when we can tell a unified story about who she was and how her
features fit together.’’75
This displacement of coherence from the text to the person is charac-
teristic of Foucault’s intellectual trajectory. In his famous essay, ‘‘What is
an author?’’ Foucault argued that invoking the figure of the author was a
way of limiting and circumscribing the potential meanings of a text and the
uses it could have for a reader.76 As Nehamas points out, in the late Fou-
cault, the author comes back as a liberating and empowering figure: if my
life can be a work of art, if I can be the author of my own life, then I can
decide how my disparate readings and experiences will cohere into a self.77
In the case of Montaigne’s reception, the figure of the author did have a
stifling effect. The search for an overall coherence in Montaigne’s philo-
sophical opinions did make many interpreters blind to the concrete aspects
of his philosophical practice. Is it the case, however, that Montaigne was
trying to construct a ‘‘self’’ through the practice of eclecticism?
The Foucault-Hadot debate on the care of the self should be illuminat-
ing here. Hadot voiced reservations about aspects of Foucault’s interpreta-
tion of ancient philosophy. In particular, he disagreed with what he saw as
an excessive emphasis on aesthetics as opposed to ethics and physics. In
that sense, when Anderson and Landy talk about an aesthetic coherence in
the character that Montaigne presents to himself and his readers, they open
themselves up to the same criticism that Hadot directed against Foucault.
According to Hadot, Foucault’s privileging of the aesthetic dimension of
the art of living was an anachronistic projection of modern categories, and
his take on ancient philosophy was ‘‘a new form of Dandyism, late
twentieth-century style.’’78
There is some truth to Hadot’s critique, yet it is not entirely fair. Fou-
cault did discuss the ethical dimensions of the care of the self, for instance
in a 1984 interview on the practice of freedom, in which he described indi-
vidual freedom in ancient Greece as an issue of ethos. As he puts it, ‘‘ethos
74 Ibid., 36.
75 Ibid.
76 Michel Foucault, ‘‘What is an Author?’’ in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 101–20.
77 The Art of Living, 179.
78 Pierre Hadot, ‘‘Reflections on the Idea of the ‘Cultivation of the Self,’ ’’ in Philosophy
as a Way of Life, 211.
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was one’s way of being and one’s way of behaving.’’79 He adds that ‘‘some-
one’s ethos can be seen in their attire, in their manner, their gait, the calm
they display in responding to events, etc. For them, this is freedom in its
concrete form.’’80 Foucault’s language here could certainly be seen as one
example of what Hadot calls his Dandyism, but more profoundly, it shows
that in the ancient conception of ethos, ethics and aesthetics could not be
separated. As we shall see now, the concept of ethos is crucial in under-
standing the sort of coherence that is on display in Montaigne’s Essays.
Anderson and Landy argue that ‘‘the philosopher of the art of living
pressures us’’81 to tell ‘‘a unified story about who she was and how her
features fit together.’’82 The result of this pressure can be seen in the recep-
tion of Foucault’s work in recent years: there has been an urge to tell a
unified story about Foucault’s character, sometimes in a deliberately hagio-
graphic fashion.83 The process here is similar to what Louis Marin de-
scribed regarding the biography of Pascal by his sister Gilberte: faced with
a work that is fragmentary, unfinished, and ambiguous, the reader is com-
pelled to construct a life that is exemplary and complete.84 Yet it seems clear
(if one may briefly indulge in speculation about authorial intent) that this
is not the kind of coherence that Foucault had in mind. As we have seen
before, Foucault insists that the practice of hypomnemata (notes made by
the philosopher for his own use) is to be distinguished from the narratives
of spiritual experience that can be found later in Christian literature.85 The
moral coherence that emerges from ‘‘writing the self’’ is not the narrative
coherence that can be found in biographies and autobiographies.
In Montaigne’s case, the urge ‘‘to tell a unified story about who he was
and how his features fit together’’ can of course be seen in Villey’s work,
which tells the story of the composition of the Essays as one of ‘‘conquest
of personality.’’86 Plausible or not, such constructions overlook the type of
coherence that is on display in the Essays themselves.
79 Michel Foucault, ‘‘L’e´thique du souci de soi comme pratique de la liberte´,’’ in Dits et
e´crits (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), 4:714.
80 Ibid.
81 Anderson and Landy, ‘‘Philosophy as Self-Fashioning. Alexander Nehamas’s Art of
Living,’’ 38.
82 Ibid., 37.
83 See David M. Halperin, Saint Foucault. Toward a Gay Hagiography (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996).
84 See Louis Marin, Pascal et Port-Royal (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997),
11–70; Pierre Force, ‘‘Ecriture fragmentaire et hagiographie: le roˆle des textes liminaires
dans la re´ception des Pense´es de Pascal,’’ Litte´ratures 55 (2007): 19–31.
85 Michel Foucault, ‘‘Writing the Self,’’ Foucault and his Interlocutors, 237.
86 Villey, Les Sources et l’e´volution des Essais de Montaigne, 2:91.
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In several places in the Essays, Montaigne claims to have what Ander-
son and Landy call a ‘‘well-integrated self.’’ In ‘‘On repentance,’’ he asserts:
‘‘I scarcely make a motion that is hidden and out of sight of my reason, and
that is not guided by the consent of nearly all parts of me, without division,
without internal sedition.’’87 Similarly, in ‘‘Of presumption,’’ he claims that
he aspires to be admired for ‘‘order, consistency, and tranquility of opinions
and conduct.’’88 He goes on to quote Cicero: ‘‘Certainly, if anything is be-
coming, it is uniformity in our whole lives and in our individual actions.’’89
Yet what Cicero calls ‘‘uniformity in our whole lives’’ (aequabilitas uni-
versae vitae) is something less than the perfect integration of one’s soul that
is described in Plato’s Republic. Moreover, when Montaigne makes a claim
about being whole and undivided, it is always in the context of a descrip-
tion of his own judgment (an important part of the soul, but not the entire
soul). In the first passage I have just quoted from ‘‘On repentance,’’ the
wholeheartedness comes from the fact that each action is prompted by
Montaigne’s judgment, and his judgment ‘‘takes all the blame or all the
praise for it.’’90 In the second passage (ending with the quote from Cicero),
the discussion is about Montaigne’s ‘‘capacity for sifting truth’’91 which he
claims to owe principally to himself.
How is judgment related to the coherence on one’s character? The ref-
erence to Cicero is helpful here. As a proponent of eclecticism, or Academic
Skepticism, Cicero describes the ethos of the eclectic philosopher. This type
of philosopher shows ‘‘uniformity’’ in his ‘‘whole life’’ not by always pro-
fessing the same doctrines, not by achieving Socratic-like integration of his
personality, but by having an ironclad commitment to his own intellectual
freedom. The coherence is not in the doctrine, it is in the attitude: ‘‘Aristip-
pus said that the chief fruit he had gathered from philosophy was that he
spoke freely and openly to everyone.’’92 Being true to oneself means that
personal freedom and intellectual integrity take precedence over doctrinal
coherence. For Montaigne, that is the main lesson of Skepticism. Again
quoting Cicero, he says of Skeptical philosophers that ‘‘the integrity of their
judgment (integra judicandi potestas) makes them freer and more indepen-
dent.’’93 As he puts it elsewhere, even more briefly, ‘‘my feelings change;
87 ‘‘Of repentance,’’ 3:2, 616.
88 ‘‘Of presumption,’’ 2:17, 499 (Cicero, De Officiis, 1.31).
89 Ibid.
90 ‘‘Of repentance,’’ 616.
91 ‘‘Of presumption,’’ 2:17, 499
92 ‘‘Of presumption,’’ 2:17, 492.
93 ‘‘Hoc liberiores et solutiores quod integra illis est judicandi potestas’’ (Academica, 2:3)
quoted in ‘‘Apology for Raymond Sebond,’’ 2:12, 373. My translation.
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my judgment no.’’94 By judgment, Montaigne does not mean the results or
productions of one’s intellectual activity but its very source.
In the rhetorical tradition, the word ethos has a technical sense that is
consistent with Foucault’s description of ethos in general, but more specific
in that it focuses on the relationship between speakers and their audiences:
ethos is the way the speaker presents himself to the audience.95 Through
verbal and physical cues, the speaker points to who he is as a person in
order to gain the audience’s trust. These cues do not need to add up to a
full and complete portrait of the speaker, but they must be coherent enough
to achieve their purpose, which is a practical one: making sure that we
listen, making sure that we open ourselves up to what the speaker has to
say. Helgeson argues that asking whether such and such early modern au-
thor had a ‘‘self’’ is not a particularly useful approach, and he proposes to
‘‘decouple the investigation of the first-person stance from the problem of
‘selfhood.’ ’’96 As he puts it, ‘‘there might be other kinds of models, models
of ‘outwardness,’ derived for example from rhetorical theory, models that
might [ . . . ] constitute alternatives to this talk about the ‘self.’ ’’97 In the
case of Montaigne, the rhetorical concept of ethos is a useful model because
it captures the coherence of the one who says ‘‘I’’ without having to engage
in speculation about a depth-structured self.
Montaigne’s ethos as author of the Essays is fundamentally tied to his
practice of eclecticism. Pascal gave an especially perceptive account of this
when he said that Montaigne’s ‘‘muddle’’ was the expression of his desire
‘‘to cut a good figure [il cherchait le bon air].’’98 The translation is slightly
misleading. Pascal does not exactly mean that Montaigne sought to ‘‘look
good,’’ but rather that he was looking for the right countenance, the right
demeanor, or, to borrow a word from Cavell in a different metaphorical
register, the right ‘‘pitch.’’99 Montaigne’s love of digression, the freedom he
shows in jumping from one author to another who says something entirely
different, is both a reflection of natural tendencies and a studied attitude
whose main significance has to be apprehended indirectly. It is about having
94 ‘‘Of presumption,’’ 2:17, 500.
95 See Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, 6.2.8–19.
96 James Helgeson, ‘‘Early Modernity Without the ‘Self ’: Notes on Anachronism and the
First Person,’’ Seventeenth Century French Studies 29 (2007): 38.
97 Ibid.
98 Pascal, Pense´es, trans. A. J. Krailsheimer (London: Penguin Books, 1966), fragment
780.
99 Stanley Cavell, A Pitch of Philosophy: Autobiographical Exercises (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1994).
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a style that says something about oneself; a disjointed style that points to a
unified personality, or rather something constant and reliable in one’s per-
sonality: in this case, an unshakeable commitment to libertas philosophandi.
According to Naya, the display of an ethos is a distinguishing characteristic
of Skepticism. Other ancient philosophies, to the extent that they engaged
in apodictic reasoning, did not develop an ethos because ‘‘reason itself does
not have a particular face, tone, or pitch.’’100 Naya’s statement would re-
quire abundant qualification, but one thing is certain: a distinctive ethos is
on display in the Essays, and it is the ethos of Ciceronian eclecticism.
The ‘‘air’’ that Pascal describes points to a fundamental openness, to a
desire and willingness to engage in conversation. A certain air invites conver-
sation as opposed to moral or physical violence101: conversation with oneself
and others. As Pascal suggested, someone who writes in this way comes
across not as an ‘‘author’’ who takes pride in his book, but as a ‘‘man’’ with
whom we can talk.102 The ultimate purpose of conversation is the reconcilia-
tion of differences (with oneself and with others), but this reconciliation is
never a final product. It is always in the making. In the ancient tradition, the
practice of philosophy usually takes place in a pedagogical or therapeutic
relationship. In Montaigne, it is a conversation between equals in the wel-
coming setting of a private home.103 All the details Montaigne gives us about
his physical characteristics, his inclinations, his tastes and distastes, are not
aimed at fashioning a ‘‘self’’ in the sense that they would add up to a more
or less coherent image or persona. More precisely, they point to a certain
way of relating to oneself and others, a way that could be defined as open,
trusting, and intimate. Writing about himself candidly and openly, present-
ing himself in a private setting, is Montaigne’s way of drawing the reader
into a conversation: ‘‘An open way of speaking opens up another man’s
speech and draws it out, as do wine and love.’’104
Columbia University.
100 Emmanuel Naya, ‘‘ ‘I Am No Philosopher’: Montaigne’s Suspension of Philosophical
Ethos,’’ in Revelations of Character: Ethos, Rhetoric and Moral Philosophy in Mon-
taigne, ed. Corinne Noirot-Maguire and Valerie M. Dionne (Cambridge: Cambridge
Scholars Publishing, 2007), 135.
101 See David Quint, Montaigne and the Quality of Mercy (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1998).
102 Pense´es, fragment 675.
103 See Marc Fumaroli, ‘‘Les Essais de Montaigne: l’e´loquence du for inte´rieur,’’ La Diplo-
matie de l’esprit (Paris: Hermann, 1994), 125–61.
104 ‘‘Of the useful and the honorable,’’ 3:1, 602.
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